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Abstract
The Internet’s importance for promoting free and open
communication has led to widespread crackdowns on its
use in countries around the world. In this study, we inves-
tigate the relationship between national policies around
freedom of speech and Internet topology in countries
around the world. We combine techniques from network
measurement and machine learning to identify features
of Internet structure at the national level that are the best
indicators of a country’s level of freedom. We find that
IP density and path lengths to other countries are the best
indicators of a country’s freedom. We also find that our
methods predict freedom categories for countries with
91% accuracy.
1 Introduction
The Internet’s role as a communication tool for activists
and dissidents has led to increasing efforts on the part
of nation states to restrict access and control information
accessed online [5]. These efforts to clamp down on In-
ternet freedom can lead to national policies that influence
the interdomain topologies of given countries (e.g., Iran’s
policy that all networks must connect via the national
telecom AS 12880 [2]) and the topologies in turn can
make certain forms of information control easier (e.g.,
country-wide Internet shut downs [7]).
In this study, we consider the relationship be-
tween interdomain topology–i.e., routing between au-
tonomous systems (ASes)–and Internet freedom in coun-
tries around the globe1. We use a combination of stan-
dard graph theoretic metrics and domain-specific fea-
tures to understand how these features relate to Internet
freedom, which we quantify using the Freedom House
1For simplicity, we consider ASes registered within a given country
as comprising the country’s AS-level graph.
Freedom of the Press index [8].2 Our goal is to under-
stand the way that online information controls can im-
pact the network topology of different countries as well
as which topologies are more likely to facilitate restric-
tions on Internet access. Understanding this relationship
can help fill in gaps in existing data sets about Inter-
net freedom, many of which require manual effort and
measurement points within the region to compute. By
looking at the interdomain topologies we can understand
which countries are similar in terms of network struc-
ture and identify regions that warrant more investigation.
Further, by understanding network properties that corre-
late with information controls we can potentially identify
countries that are in a good position to perform filter-
ing or Internet shutdowns and see the legacy effects after
filtering has been repealed. While it may seem simple,
studying the interdomain topology around the globe re-
quires care to avoid known blind spots in existing data.
We perform traceroutes using RIPE Atlas [12] to expose
additional edges in and around different countries (§2.2).
We use a state-of-the-art BGP path simulator [10] which
allows us to consider graph theoretic metrics with paths
that incorporate routing policy vs. simple shortest path.
We combine our empirically derived data with existing
AS-level topologies [6] to characterize the interdomain
topologies of countries around the globe. We consider a
variety of structural features and domain specific features
and characterize their relationship to free communication
and find that the number of IP addresses per individual
(IP density) is the most important predictor of Internet
freedom(§4). We leverage these features and machine
learning techniques to group countries based on their in-
terdomain topologies (§3.2).
2We use this index over the Freedom on the Net score [9] because
it has been calculated for 199 countries, whereas Freedom on the Net
only covers 66 countries.
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Figure 1: AS relationships on the Internet
2 Internet Topology Data Sets
In this section, we provide background on the Internet
topology and describe our methodology for improving
the fidelity of existing data sets.
2.1 Initial Topology
Central to our approach are graphs of the Internet topol-
ogy of each country. These graphs are empirically de-
rived and are comprised of autonomous systems (ASes)
as nodes and connections between them as edges. An
AS generally represents a network under the control of a
single entity (e.g., an ISP, university or business). Each
edge is annotated with the inferred business relationship
between the two ASes it connects (i.e., who pays who).
Figure 1 illustrates an example topology where AS 1 is a
customer of AS 2 and pays it for transit and AS 2 and AS
3 are settlement-free peers exchanging traffic at no cost.
We start from the AS graph published by CAIDA [6]
which includes all observed ASes and is labeled with in-
ferred business relationships [11].
Since ASes may span multiple countries and even con-
tinents, we make a simplifying assumption and consider
an AS to belong to the country it is registered in. We de-
termine where each AS in the topology is registered us-
ing datasets from the regional Internet registries (RIRs).
2.2 Increasing Coverage
A key challenge we face in this work, is contending with
known incompleteness of existing AS-level topologies.
Specifically, edges close to the network edge, particu-
larly settlement-free peering edges are particularly hard
to observe. Further, the bulk of data for Internet topology
mapping is derived from BGP monitors that tend to be lo-
cated in the Americas, Europe and Asia vs. the Middle
East, Africa and other regions known to be implementing
online information controls. We use the RIPE Atlas plat-
form [12] and perform targeted traceroutes to uncover
these missing edges.
We focus on illuminating two key types of connectiv-
ity: (1) international connectivity of each country and
(2) domestic connectivity of the countries. We devise
two tracerouting strategies to uncover these two types of
edges.
Inside-out and Outside-in. In order to find undis-
covered international edges from a country, we need to
traceroute from domestic sources to international desti-
nations and vice versa (we call these traceroutes “Inside-
Out” and “Outside-in”). We perform traceroutes from
a set of domestic RIPE Atlas probes to a randomly se-
lected set of international probes for each country. This
technique of measuring “Inside-Out” exposes links that
are used by traffic flowing out of the country. Similarly,
we perform traceroutes from the randomly selected in-
ternational probes to the set of domestic probes (measur-
ing “Outside-In”). The size of the subset of probes (both
domestic probes and international) is progressively in-
creased, starting from 5, in steps of 5 until no new edges
are seen in 3 consecutive sets of measurements.
Mesh. For discovering new edges local to the coun-
try (domestic edges connect two domestic ASes), we
traceroute from a domestic source to a domestic destina-
tion (we call these traceroutes “Mesh traceroutes” since
they are between all pairs of domestic traceroute vantage
points, forming a mesh).
Mapping traceroutes back to AS paths. We take care
when converting our new traceroute measurements to AS
paths. Specifically, we use a list of prefixes belonging
to Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) published by Peer-
ingDB [4] to identify and remove IP hops in our tracer-
outes that are located in IXPs. After removing hops in
IXPs, we use CAIDA’s IP prefix to ASN mapping [1] to
convert the traceroute to an AS-level path.
Inferring relationships. Inferring business relation-
ships between ASes is a challenging problem and open
area of research. We take the following approach to in-
fer business relationships on new edges discovered via
our traceroute measurements. We begin by retrieving the
inferred relationships for any edges that appear in our
traceroute and in the existing dataset from CAIDA. We
use these inferred relationships combined with the as-
sumption that ASes will only transit traffic between two
neighboring ASes if at least one of these neighbors is a
customer (the “valley free” assumption) to constrain the
business relationship for a given edge.
Table 1 summarizes the new edges found using the two
methods described above. From the table it is clear that
domestic mesh traceroutes were the most beneficial, ex-
posing a total of 5,562 new edges. Further, the bene-
fit of adding more probes to the Inside-out traces begins
to level off around 25 probes. Table 2 summarizes the
countries that benefited most from the additional mea-
surements and the number of new edges uncovered in
each case.
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Measurement Type Total New AS edges
I/O with 5 probes 85
I/O with 10 probes 180
I/O with 15 probes 334
I/O with 20 probes 509
I/O with 25 probes 647
Domestic mesh 5,562
Table 1: Benefit of measurements in terms of newly discovered
AS edges (I/O represents Inside-out/Outside-in traceroutes).
Country Total AS edges
RU 957
US 547
FR 443
GB 441
UA 304
Table 2: Top countries in terms of new edges.
3 AS Topology and Internet Freedom
We study the connection between the AS-level topology
derived in the previous section and the freedom of infor-
mation in a given country. The Freedom House Freedom
of the Press Index (FPI), lying between 0 (high freedom)
and 100 (low freedom), serves as a proxy for the freedom
of information in a country. Our approach is to use fea-
tures extracted from AS-level topologies as input to ma-
chine learning methods to predict 100−FPI as the target
metric, which has a higher value for a higher degree of
freedom.
In this section, we describe the features and machine
learning methods that we use in our approach. We eval-
uate the accuracy of these methods in §3.3.
3.1 Features of the AS topologies
For each AS-level topology, we compute a set of features
and meta-information. We break these features into four
broad categories. Below, we briefly describe each class
with a few examples; Table 3 enumerates the complete
set of features considered.
1. Structural Features. This includes features of the
AS-graph related to its structure such as the number
of nodes or edges and connectivity features.
2. International Connectivity Features This include
features related to how a country connects to net-
works in other countries. Specifically, how many
countries and networks does it connect to and what
are its path lengths to other countries.
3. IP Demographic Features. This captures how
much of the IP address space does the country con-
trol. It also considers the relationship between IP
space and the population of the countries (i.e., how
many IPs are there per person).
4. BGP Routing Features. This includes features
related to properties of ISPs and networks in the
country. We consider the counts of small stub net-
works, large providers, and percentiles of the cus-
tomer cone size of networks in the country.
Preprocessing the features. Since the values of differ-
ent features lie in different ranges, we scale each feature
using min-max scaling:
Xˆ =
X−Xmin
Xmax−Xmin (1)
Where Xˆ is the scaled value for a feature with original
value X. Xmin and Xmax are the minimum and maximum
values of that feature across all countries. After scaling,
all features lie in the range (0,1). However we observe a
number of outliers in the feature values. To mitigate their
effect on our prediction we removed the countries with
outlier features from the training data. As a result, we
removed US, RU, SC and NL from the training data. The
AS graphs of RU and US are much larger than the other
countries. In case of NL, the presence of IXPs biases
features relating to AS relationships (like the number of
peering edges). SC has an IP density value magnitudes
higher than all other countries.
3.2 Predicting Freedom of the Press Index
(FPI)
We predict the FPI for 170 countries3 using these fea-
tures. We consider four different machine learning mod-
els of increasing complexity for this task. We note that
our methods automatically account for the features that
do not individually correlate with FPI.
Linear Regression (LR). We used the features to train a
linear regression model. This method finds a linear func-
tion of the features that best predicts the FPI. This type
of method performs well when the target variable is a
globally linear function of the features.
Regularised Linear Regression (LASSO). Due to the
small number of data points, the LR model may overfit
in the face of many features. To avoid overfitting, we
make use of LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Se-
lection Operator) that shrinks dimensionality by select-
ing the most predictive features trying to jointly mini-
mize prediction loss as well as L1-norm of the feature
space.
3FPI values are available for 199 countries but we could not com-
pute the feature values for some countries due to lack of information
and hence these counld could not be a part of the study.
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Table 3: Feature categories and description
Features of Countries
Category Name Description
Structural Features
f1: num nodes Number of nodes in the country’s graph
f2: num edges Number of edges in the country’s graph
f3: percentile degree 95th percentile of the node degrees in the graph
f4: diameter Diameter of the country’s AS graph
f5:avg h im Average horizontal imbalance
f6: max load cen Maximum load centrality of a node in the AS graph
f7: avg clustering Average clustering coefficient of the graph
f8: graph clique number Size of the largest clique in the graph
f9: alg conn AUC of decay of algebraic connectivity as nodes are removed
in order of AS rank
f10: frac conn AUC of decay of fraction of largest connected component as
nodes are removed in order of AS rank
f11: transitivity the fraction of all possible triangles present in the graph
f12: num large nodes Number of nodes in the graph with degree
International
Connectivity Features
f12: max path len maximum length of routed paths from a given country to all
other countries
f13: num intl countries Number of countries, a country directly connects to
f14: num intl nodes Number of nodes providing international connectivity
IP Demographic
Features
f15: ip density Number of IPs per person
f16: num announced ip Number of prefixes announced by the country
BGP Routing Features
f17: num large providers Number of ASes with customer cone size >100
f18: percentile cust cone 95th percentile of the customer cone sizes in the country
f19: stub ases Number of stub ASes
f20: tot peer edges Number of AS edges in the graph that are p2p
In addition to the linear models, we consider deci-
sion tree-based approaches. The advantage of these ap-
proaches is that they are non-linear and divide the dataset
into groups that are similar with respect to the features.
The prediction function within each group is then de-
cided as part of the model design.
Decision Tree with simple averaging at the leaves
(DTLA) We train a decision tree model that groups sim-
ilar countries in a group. We predict the FPI of countries
in the same bucket by taking an average of actual FPI
values in the group.
Decision Tree with Linear Regression at leaves
(DTLR) This model is similar to the last one. How-
ever, instead of predicting the FPI for a group based on
its average, a linear regression is run within each group
to predict the FPI values. We note that we only perform
the linear regression in groups that have size at least 10;
for the remaining groups we take the average (as in the
previous approach). The prediction function within each
leaf is then decided as part of the model design
3.3 Evaluating Predicted FPIs
We evaluate the four models described above using the
170 countries present in the 2012 FPI values for which it
was possible to compute the features described in Table
3. We use leave-one-out cross validation (LOOCV) to
evaluate the ML methods. We train each of the 4 models
(LR, LASSO, DTLA, DTLR) with all but one country
and then evaluate how well we predict the leftout coun-
try. This process is repeated in turn for all 170 countries.
Predicting FPI. Figure 3 shows the estimated kernel
density function for the distribution of prediction errors
for each of the four aforementioned models. We find
LR and LASSO that perform linear regression across
the entire dataset, provide poor accuracy with an aver-
age prediction error of 15.05%. The decision tree model
(DTLA) has modestly increased accuracy but the aver-
age prediction error reamined close to 15.04%. Perform-
ing linear regression within the groups produced by the
decision tree (DTLR) has the highest accuracy with an
average prediction error of 7.06%.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative distributon of normal-
ized error (i.e., predictedFPIactualFPI ) for the four models. We note
that the best model–decision tree with linear regression–
has an error of atmost 10%, 71% of the time.
Predicting freedom category. Freedom House groups
countries based on their FPI value: (61− 100) Free,
(31− 60) Partly-Free, and (0− 30) Not Free. We also
consider how well our model predicts the category a
country will fall under. By discretizing the predictions
of DTLR, we were able to predict the freedom categories
with 81% accuracy. The countries for which DTLR pre-
dicted freedom category wrongly, often, our prediction
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Figure 3: Comparison of the prediction error of our learning
approaches.
and the actual freedom category were partly-free and free
(and vice versa). If we consider free and partly-free as
the same label, our accuracy of prediction improves to
91%.
4 Features that Predict Freedom
We now discuss which features are the most relevant
for predicting FPI using our most accurate classification
model (decision tree with linear regression).
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Figure 4: CDF of the prediction error of our learning ap-
proaches.
IP density has the highest influence on the freedom in-
dex. As Figure 2 shows, a normalised IP density value of
0.169 or higher implies high freedom of expression in a
country. This metric captures the ratio of IP addresses to
users within a country and can be seen as approximating
the level of connectivity per capita in the country.
We also observe a negative correlation between the
maximum length of BGP policy compliant paths from
a country to all other countries (max p len). Normalised
max p len value of 0.433 or lower ensures high freedom
in a country. This makes intuitive sense since longer
paths imply poor connectivity.
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(a) Singapore
(b) Iran
Figure 5: AS graphs for Singapore and Iran (red/dark nodes
are international ASes and light nodes are domestic.
We find that poor connectivity properties tend to corre-
spond to countries with low FPI values. Countries with
high path length, low degree values and low transivity
(i.e., number of “triangles” in the graph) are among the
lowest in terms of FPI scores. This first group includes
countries that are known to implement strong informa-
tion controls (e.g., Ethiopia, China, Cuba).
5 Identifying Unusual Countries
Our decision tree can also highlight countries with con-
nectivity profiles that are not consistent with their infor-
mation control policies. There two such instances that
stand out in Figure 2: Botswana and Singapore. In case
of Singapore, according to our prediction the FPI should
be very high ( 80). But in reality the FPI index of SG is
31. On the other hand, our FPI prediction for Botswana
is very low (29.25) but in reality Botswana has high free-
dom of expression.
We dig deeper into the case of Singapore. Singapore
respresents a country with a well established IT infras-
tructure that also implements online information con-
trols [3]. We can see this difference qualitatively in Fig-
ure 5 which compares the connectivity graphs of Singa-
pore and one of the least free countries, Iran. Iran shows
strong limits in terms of international connectivity, con-
necting to only three international networks. Singapore,
in contrast, has a rich international connectivity with 257
domestic ASes connecting to a total of 3022 international
ASes.
6 Conclusions
Freedom House FPI assesses the degree of freedom in
digital and print media for countries across the globe.
Using FPI as a measure of freedom of expression, we in-
vestigate the relationship between Internet infrastructure
and information freedom around the globe. Our tech-
niques can help bootstrap understandings of information
freedom when empirical data may not be readily avail-
able. We are also able to identify features of AS topolo-
gies that are more representative of countries that imple-
ment online information controls.
Future work. While this work presents a first explo-
ration of the relationship between Internet infrasturcture
and information freedom, there is still much ground to be
covered in this space. In future work, we plan to take a
two pronged approach to extend this study. Specifically,
we hope to leverage social science expertise to better rea-
son about the social and political factors that impact in-
formation policy and discuss our findings with operators
of existing large networks to see how policy shapes their
day-to-day network management.
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